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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Based on the source dynamism of Asian countries and by looking back about half a 
century development in Asia, all facts indicate that countries strategic capacities 
provide a significant ingredient for economic growth (Weiss, 1994, pp.85). But why 
some states can bring their orders as well as their purposes and their business firms can 
be efficient with a better performance while others cannot? 
Adam Smith addressed that governments have significant roles in creating an 
environment to support rising productivity (Porter, 1998, pp.7, Gittell, Magnusson, & 
Merenda, 2012, pp.102). Hereby, the environment mainly focuses on the policies and 
relationships of economy and business.  
This paper points out how business-government relations work in Asian countries, 
especially emphasizing China. The rise of China is undoubtedly one of the brilliant 
miracles of the 21st century (Ikenberry, 2008, pp.23). China experienced a growing 
economy with the huge market and business potential and became the second biggest 
country in terms of GDP. However, due to the limitation of coherent business laws, 
government supervision, and varieties of firms' ownership, entering China's market 
involves an enormous amount of difficulties (Nee, 1992; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Lee, Pae, 
& Wong, 2001, pp.51). Therefore, developing networks will be the necessary and 
essential method for firms to enhance their marketing effectiveness and efficiency 
(Sheth & Parvatiyar, 1995). The Chinese call these personal networks or the 
interpersonal relationships "guanxi” and business-government relationship belongs to 
interest guanxi. Due to the same cultural root— Confucianism, Japan will be mentioned 
as a comparison with China in “guanxi”. When “guanxi” comes to people’s eyesight, 
another related word “corruption” always seems to appear together.  
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Most published, related pieces of literature either focus on the causality between 
corruption and environment, including the external politics, the economy, and the 
society etc. Some talk how to design anti-corruption instruments, establish justice 
system and improve the marketization etc. In this paper, emphasis will be put into firm-
level corruption and what kind of firms are more likely to build these relations. This 
also indicates that these companies have more possibilities to do bribery.  
As far as I know, none of the published literature mentioned clearly what kind of firms’ 
have higher corruption suspicions. Even some papers discuss one or more 
characteristics, most of those results are based on empirical evidence or theoretical 
foundation. Therefore, these results will not only be quoted in this paper but will also 
be tested for in the methodology part.   
In the quantitative study, I used the rich firm-level dataset from the World Banks China 
Enterprise Survey 2012. The survey includes 2489 privately-owned and 87 foreign 
owned firms. It also introduces firm variables such as location, ownership, target market, 
size etc. My approach was to combine the existing evidences and the firm data and the 
results showed that foreign owned, capital city located and national market targeting 
large companies are more likely to build interest guanxi, which also has significant 
possibilities or risk to be involved in corruption. 
The whole paper will be divided into the following sections: I introduce the business-
government relation in Chapter1. Followed by Charpter 2, in which I put my emphasis 
especially on “Guanxi” in China and discuss the guanxi definition, type, function and 
compare those with Japan. In Chapter 3 I state the corruption phenomenon in China and 
compared it with another third-tier transition economy --Vietnam. In addition, I explore 
which kinds of enterprises are more likely to establish business-government relations 
and have the potential to do corruption. I do this with data and graphical support in 
Chapter 4. Furthermore, I discuss the results and implication in Chapter 5. Last but not 
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the least in Chapter 6, I reach my conclusion and point out some study limitations and 
future research possibilities that occurred. 
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Chapter 2  
A Review of Guanxi and Corruption Literature 
2.1 The Definition of Business-Government Relation 
In a market economy, the government and public policies establish the legal system and 
some specific rules which all the market businesses need to obey. To some extent, 
government systems and policies decide these businesses to undertake revenues, costs, 
and net earnings. Businesses pay taxes to use public services while the government 
collects tax revenues to fund and finance government operations. (Gittell, Magnusson, 
& Merenda, 2012, pp.102). The main aim of businesses is to make profits while it is 
the governments' target to ensure a stable economic and employment increase. Both of 
them are different but pretty much co-dependent. 
Business and government relations are closely connected with each other. On the one 
hand, due to the strong influences from government policies, businesses generally keep 
in touch with the government in order to benefit from the policies or even try to make 
some impact on public decisions and policies (Gittell, Magnusson,& Merenda, 2012, 
pp.99). The terms effectiveness and efficiency are vital to the business entity, 
maintaining business survival and continuous profitability, which can be guaranteed by 
cooperation (Calder, 1995, pp.613). 
On the other hand, from a business perspective on governments, they should choose the 
perspective that firms or industries take as a main developing target for the future. 
Therefore, they prefer to publish some policies which can encourage these businesses. 
Additionally, the government should favour and stimulate businesses performance and 
investments. Since businesses are the main source of jobs, innovation, and societal 
economic well- being, the government should generate grants, tax credits, and subsidies 
to support businesses in the case of another Great Recession (Gittell, Magnusson, & 
Merenda, 2012, pp.118). In other words, business-government relations on trade issues 
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are characterized as protectionist lobbying or – less often – the member of the 
liberalization of markets lobby (Woll, & Artigas, 2007, pp.121-138). However, with 
states dominating the process, both public and private agencies are increasingly 
involved. Some literature sees public- private cooperation as a limit to state capacity 
and thus a challenge to statism and corruption (Weiss, 1995). 
In one word, the business-government relation is the balance of power and 
responsibility for determining output, consumption and the price. And the availability 
of government means for discussing issues and solving problems effectively contributes 
to their destination (Vietor, 1987, pp.1) 
2.2 Guanxi In China 
In China, guanxi is the central part of the business-government relation. A personalized 
and close relationship is called guanxi, which is often considered as a necessary 
condition to start a new business in China (Xin, & Pearce, 1996). To make the definition 
easier, guanxi means good connections (Tsang, 1998, pp. 64-73). 
In general, guanxi does not have good or wrong influence. It only works when people 
need to use it. Since the government is made up by people, who are in charge of the 
government. They are making policies and decisions. On account that businesses are 
eager to have sustainable competitive advantages, guanxi becomes valuable and rare. 
For the firm level, the Chinese call it “business-government relation” and guanxi-based 
business culture has a significant and positive influence on venture's accounting and 
market performance (Luo, 1997. pp.51-70). For the personal network or the managers 
view, it is called "guanxi". 
2.3 Different Guanxi Type 
Guanxi is typical in the Chinese culture as a phenomenon and only exist in the Chinese 
society in this way. Decades ago, non-Chinese speakers had no idea of this Chinese 
words, but nowadays most economic students have heart about it. Similar ideas can be 
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found in almost every country. Guanxi is absolutely essential to fulfilling any tasks in 
virtually all spheres of social life in China (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002). I divided 
guanxi into three types. The first, I call “friendship guanxi”. The second type is “family 
guanxi”. The third but also the most direct one is “interest guanxi”. Guanxi is easy to 
build, but also it is fragile, or difficult to substain (Tsang,1998, pp. 64-73). No matter 
for governments or companies, they all consist of people, who are moveable. When 
they leave their positions, guanxi will be disrupted as well. However, this guanxi is not 
mutually exclusive as they represent a concentric circle of contacts (Hwang, 1987).  
2.3.1 Family Guanxi 
Family guanxi is the most permanent and stable relationships among these three 
relations, since it is based on blood ties. It is also called “expressive ties” by Lee, Pae, 
and Wong in 2001. Family guanxi is narrowed down within a particular scope such as 
parents and relatives. 
2.3.2 Friendship Guanxi 
Friendship here has a general meaning, which includes classmates, schoolmates, 
colleagues, neighbors, same hometown etc. They are personal and practical 
relationships between exchange partners (Lee, Pae, & Wong, 2001).  
In general, these people are strangers while during certain circumstances, such as by 
doing the same business or by having similar interests, they will have closer relations. 
It should be pointed out that the boundaries between friendship guanxi and interest 
guanxi are rather fluent (Hwang, 1987). In other words, friendship guanxi can turn into 
interest guanxi, and vice versa (Lee, Pae, & Wong, 2001) 
2.3.3 Interest Guanxi 
Interest guanxi could also be called "benefit guanxi” or “Instrumental ties”. It is the 
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most unstable and temporary guanxi among these three. To realize the resource 
allocation and maximize equity, buyers and sellers are more willing to build this type 
of guanxi (Hwang, 1987, Dwyer, 1987; Macneil, 1980). Therefore, interest guanxi has 
a distinct characteristic called impersonal and utilitarian (Lee, Pae, & Wong, 2001). It 
can be used in politics or business situation, such as the operations of informal policy 
and the potentially for social networks to evolve into something resembling civil society 
(Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002). In this paper, I will only talk about interest guanxi, 
which has the closest tights to business-government relationships in China. 
2.4 Guanxi Function/Advantages/Disadvantages 
Guanxi has its own merits and demerits. From the positive aspect, guanxi provides a 
better method to overcome the recourse or information limitation. Meanwhile, guanxi 
offers a preferential treatment in business cooperation and avoids external risk and 
competition. In China, guanxi is especially vital to the start-up business sector (Arias, 
1998; Davies, 1995; Wong, 1998). Hall and Hall (1987) argued that developing 
interpersonal relationships and mutual understanding at the personal level is a pre-
requisite for business success both in China as well as in the Japanese society. Some 
economists regard this guanxi as “grease money” which lubricates the squeaky wheels 
of rigid bureaucracy and commerce (Clarke, & Xu, 2004).   
For international business, developing close and personal relationships helps them to 
understand the mutual business model, the business culture and to get more similarities. 
Besides, even two firms from the entirely different cultural background, they can still 
make an effort to find similarity, enhance their cultural affinity, reduce alienation and 
making them familiar with Chinese business operations (Ford, 1980; Hallen & 
Johanson, 1985).  
Negative views show that guanxi may lead to corruption, such as favoritism and 
nepotism. Here I mainly talk about firm-level corruption. There is no literature arguing 
that any agreement can be made about the effects of corruption on economic growth. 
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Admittedly, corruption can raise the economic efficiency if the government has 
inefficient regulations and corruption can help business to develop quickly and 
smoothly. 
However, on the other side, some economists argue that guanxi is expanding in the 
market which substantially influences the rational-legal systems that define the Western 
market economies (Gold, Guthrie, & Wank, 2002). A lot of studies conclude that 
corruption slows down development (Gould & Amaro-Reyes, 1983; United Nations, 
1989; Klitgaard, 1991). Corruption destroys fair marketing and hurts innovative 
activities (Heidenheimer, Johnston, & LeVine, 1970, pp.26-27). Government 
corruption is defined as the sale of government property by officers and gaining 
personal profit (Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993. pp.599). For example, officers sell some 
licenses and permissions paid by a certain value of the contract or other informal 
payments from private businesses. Obviously, the risk of corruption is to be caught and 
punished, and the probability of this consequence mainly depends on the effectiveness 
of the country's legal system (Treisman, 2000, pp.399-457).  
The Chinese central government decentralizes its fiscal, investment, and foreign trade 
policies, which have granted localities and created opportunities for promoting 
entrepreneurship (Wu, 1997. pp.319-346). This also provides corruption chances for 
local governments. Local governments offer official patronage in exchange for extra 
incomes. In the same time, the extra money local governments earned will become 
revenue and move to central governments treasury (Wu, 1997. pp.319-346).  
Recently the sales amount of the luxury brand Louis Vuitton decreased dramatically in 
the mainland, China and some people said it is because of anti-corruption policies. They 
say that they cannot buy bags as a gift. Although it is just a rumor or a joke to some 
extent, it can be seen that anti-corruption in China achieves some success. Although 
this gloomy effect can be eliminated with the help of opening the market, improved 
legislation, completing government controls and developing technology, it still takes a 
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long time for the Chinese government to realize its anti-corruption actions (Arias, 1998; 
Davies, 1995; Wong, 1998).  
2.5 Guanxi in a Japanese Context: Amakudari  
Guanxi is original based on a cultural root, especially out of Confucius values, which 
is the core of the Chinese culture, or even all East Asian cultures. Confucianism, 
together with Buddhism is one of the traditional links that bind the Chinese and 
Japanese cultures. Confucianism is a non-theistic philosophy emphasizing wisdom 
gained from education, love in human relations, and the pleasure of effort expended in 
doing good. It conceives society from a humanistic rather than a spiritual point of view, 
as group-structured. It fixes role responsibilities in relationships of the social structure, 
placing a high value upon self-esteem, reciprocity, harmony, and loyalty to the nation 
and one's work group (Bartels, 1982. pp.4-12). Bartels (1982) also concludes some key 
words about the Japanese business culture, such as Close-knit social structure, family 
or group-orientation, fixed relationships, obligations, scaled loyalty obligations, 
mutuality of obligations etc. Some key words also exist in the Chinese business culture. 
As Hofstede and Bond (1988) assumed culture values are one of the main factors to 
affect the economy and business growth. Japanese business is the epitome of 
Confucianism culture, which is homogeneous to Chinas. However, de factor Japan 
ranks among the least corrupt countries in the world. Companies face very low risks of 
corruption in Japan, dissimilar with complicated Chinese situation. In China it is called 
guanxi while it is offered as “Amakudari” in Japan.  
2.51 Old Boy Network And Amakudari 
When talking about Japanese business-government relations, it is impossible to ignore 
a standard network called "old boy", which is one of the striking features in Japan. Old 
boy phenomenon is mentioned almost in every comprehensive study to indicate tight 
government-business relations, for example by Schaede (1995), Clyde (1988), 
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Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) etc. These retired old boys are so called “amakudari”. 
One reason of the existence of Old Boy phenomenon is due to the aging society.  
Old boy (OB) phenomenon means that after government officials retire from long life 
in civil service, they will be hired as a board in private companies. They apply with 
their expertise and personal networks to begin their second career life and hence 
increase lifetime income. Johnson (1982) indicated that the OBs constitute part of the 
underlying mechanism of the "bureaucrat-led economic growth" of post-war Japan. 
Meanwhile, the OB phenomenon is also the primary and basic method for Japanese 
bureaucracy. In contrast, Calder (1989) suggests that only firms that need government 
help will hire old boys. Apart from that, some smaller firms or non-Tokyo firms will 
also hire OB in order to increase their firm’s position and power and be closer to capital 
(Schaede, 1995, pp.293-317). Additionally, OB can help small firms to be access to 
core information from governments and receive some form of protection.  
There are several ways to let OB continue in their career and function. First of all, OBs 
use their personal connections and seniority hierarchies which are exactly the same as 
normal people's network. Secondly, there is a mechanism called "vintage meetings" for 
OB. Each class of bureaucrats in a certain ministry holds regular meetings, typically a 
monthly lunch. Because of the step-by-step retirement, these retired officials still have 
members or networks at the ministry or department. The third mechanism is "OB 
meetings" which is organized by the ministry itself and held quarterly in order to make 
sure information flows in and out smoothly. During this lunch meeting, an incumbent 
bureaucrat delivers a speech to his retired seniors concerning regulatory or policy issues 
currently discussed within the ministry. Then they will talk about what they are doing 
now and share news instead of talking about business directly.  
2.6 Interweave Between Guanxi and Corruption 
2.61 The Role of Guanxi in Corruption 
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As I mentioned above, guanxi has enormous advantages, but also it has a negative 
aspect which is regarded to as corruption. Generally, it is difficult to define whether 
guanxi is good or not because guanxi and corruption become increasingly intertwined 
as China is moving towards a demoralized society (Luo, 2008). It is necessary to point 
out here that the debate between the relationship of guanxi and corruption has continued 
for a long time among scholars and economists. Fewer pieces of literature argue that 
the significance of corruption and the salience of guanxi are separated with each other 
in China. Certain numbers of scholars believe that guanxi is the part of the root of 
corruption culture while others insist that guanxi is distinguished from corruption 
because corruption is where two parties establish a short-term and benefit-based 
relationship while guanxi has the foundation of long-term trust and personal 
relationship (Li, 2011). Nowadays guanxi and corruption are used by all kinds of people 
for various purposes, actively or passively, such as rent-seeking businesses, worried 
parents looking for child education opportunities, college students seeking for jobs and 
nervous salesmen intending to secure some large block orders etc. (Luo, 2008). 
2.62 Guanxi and Gifts 
Somehow it is vexing to define corruption (Bardhan,1997) because guanxi and 
corruption are always interwoven. Take Japans old boy network as an example. The 
government organized a seasonal meeting for current officers and old boys who have 
retired from the government and work for a company. During this session, it is de jure 
acceptable and rational when they only drink tea or coffee. But de facto if they spent 
more than a certain amount of money, it is a suspicious for them of receiving gifts, 
which is contradictory. Gifts are the most common tool in guanxi to establish or bring 
equilibrium to the relationship. If one is feeling too indebted or stressed to another, that 
person may bring a gift to bring the relationship back into balance. Therefore, it is hard 
to say whether it is a normal guanxi development or abnormal corruption. It can even 
develop as the misuse of entrusted power in exchange for private benefits. Overall, 
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empirical evidences demonstrate that fighting corruption in many countries has proved 
so difficult.  
2.63 Two Kinds of Corruption 
Bardhan (1997) put forward a definition of corruption which has been accepted by 
academia as ‘the use of public office for private gain’. Mathieu Deflem (1995) pointed 
out that there are two main kinds of corruption which can be applied all over the world 
(Table 2.1). One is monetary corruption, which is based on money. This guanxi is 
carried out with an effective money transfer between consumers and producers in order 
to get service or products, such as companies and officials, which is also the main 
discussion topic in this thesis. The other type is called bureaucratic corruption which 
uses "power" or "right" as a tie to connect dominant position and loyal behavior. Old 
boy systems in Japan are similar to this type. 
Table 2.1 Type of Corruptions 1 
Type of Corruption 1 Corrupted 
Medium Of 
Exchange 
Corruptor 
Monetary Corruption Consumer 
Service/Goods 
Money 
Producer 
Bureaucratic 
Corruption 
Client 
Loyalty 
Position Of Power 
Administrator 
Source: Mathieu. 1995.  
Schramm and Taube (2003) offered another distinction between spot-market corruption 
and relational corruption (Table 2.2). Spot-market corruption means that in order to 
avoid isolated or short-terms, even immediate punishment or privilege, all transactions 
will be carried out. These transactions will be ended after the termination of property 
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right or without the participation of economy activities (Schramm, & Taube, 2003). As 
an illustration, a driver gives money to the traffic police in order to avoid payings for 
higher bills or to cross the road and save time. Instead of isolated or short-term sport-
market corruption, relational corruption is more frequent in Asian countries. It begins 
with the attainment of a system-immanent advantage or resource by influencing the 
political decision-making process on various levels (Schramm, & Taube, 2003). 
Therefore, it is a long-term and multi-lateral transactional relation. 
Table 2.2 Type of Corruptions 2 
Type of Corruption 2 Characteristics Situation 
Spot-Market 
Corruption 
Short-Term 
Isolated 
Avoid Problems Or Violence 
Relational Corruption 
Long-Term 
Multilateral 
Gain License/Resource/Contacts Etc. 
Most Common In Asia 
Source: Schramm, M. and Taube, M. (2003)  
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Chapter 3 
Corruption in China  
3.1 Corruption situation in Asia 
Corruption and fighting against corruption have a long history in China. It is widely 
held that corruption in China has increased to an epidemic or even entered an endemic 
period since the advent of reforms in the late 1970s. (Johnston & Hao, 1993, pp. 80–
94; Root, 1996, pp. 741–757; Pei, 1999, pp. 94–110). Yet a conventional opinion 
demonstrates incompletely that the early reform period was characterized as a 
quantitative increase and the later reform period witnessed and transmitted into 
"intensification" of corruption (Wederman, 2004). This situation continued for 35 years. 
I, as one of the young generation who lived and studied under Chinese traditional 
education system, heard about "anti-corruption" and "anti-graft" on the 18th National 
Congress which was held in November 2012. Since then corruption in China has been 
subject to significant media attention and reached impressive achievements. According 
to People Daily and a Global Times report on March 3th, 2017, fighting against 
corruption has ranked first out of ten hottest topics in China’s 2017 two sessions.   
Based on CPI official website, China ranked 79th out of 176 countries in CPI 
1(Corruption Perception Index) of Transparency International in 2016. Compared with 
100th in 2014. China did something impressive on anti-graft project, which put China 
comparable to Malaysia and India. Chinas neighbors such as Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, 
North Korea etc. are more corrupted than mainland, China. But China is more corrupt 
than Singapore, Japan etc. (More detailed ranking is shown in Table 3.1). Hereby, the 
definition of corruption by CPI includes graft, bribery, embezzlement, backdoor deals, 
nepotism, patronage, and statistical falsification.  
Table 3.1 Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 In Asia Pacific Region 
                                            
1 the CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt a country's public sector is awarded of. It 
is a composite index which is collected by a variety of reputable institutions and combined surveys and 
assessments of corruption. https://towardstransparency.vn/corruption-perception-index-2 
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World 
Ranking 
2016 
Country 2016 
score 
2015 
score 
2014 
score 
2013 
score 
2012 
score 1 New Zealand 90 88 91 91 90 
7 Singapore 84 85 84 86 87 
13 Australia 79 79 80 81 85 
15 Hong Kong 77 75 74 75 77 
20 Japan 72 75 76 74 74 
27 Bhutan 65 65 65 63 63 
31 Taiwan 61 62 61 61 61 
41 Brunei 58 N/A N/A 60 55 
52 Korea (South) 53 56 55 55 56 
55 Malaysia 49 50 52 50 49 
72 Solomon Islands 42 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
79 China 40 37 36 40 39 
79 India 40 38 38 36 36 
87 Mongolia 38 39 39 38 36 
90 Indonesia 37 36 34 32 32 
95 Maldives 36 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
95 Sri Lanka 36 37 38 37 40 
101 Philippines 35 35 38 36 34 
101 Thailand 35 38 38 35 37 
101 Timor-Leste 35 28 28 30 33 
113 Vietnam 33 31 31 31 31 
116 Pakistan 32 30 29 28 27 
123 Laos 30 25 25 26 21 
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131 Nepal 29 27 29 31 27 
136 Myanmar 28 22 21 21 15 
136 Papua New guinea 
Guinea 
28 25 25 25 25 
145 Bangladesh 26 25 25 27 26 
156 Cambodia 21 21 21 20 22 
169 Afghanistan 15 11 12 8 8 
174 Korea (North) 12 8 8 8 8 
Source: www.transparency.org/cpi for more information 
In order to discuss the Asian corruption in the world range, I quote Transparency 
International's annual CPI result (2011) which aggregated independent surveys from 
across the globe. The middle-bottom line is formed mainly of Asian countries such as 
India, China, Vietnam while developed and good welfare countries such as Singapore 
and Japan stand out among other Asian countries. It is interesting to see that Asian 
countries gather when the corruption index is between 0.4-0.7 and it is also the strong 
connection area. Outliers include small but well-run poorer Asia countries such as 
Bhutan. Overall, I find that informal payments are much more widespread in countries 
where infrastructure and human rights are less developed or undeveloped. In other 
words, governments negative rent-seeking behaviour such as corruption is more 
common in less socially beneficial systems than in completed welfare countries. 
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Figure 3.1 A correlation between corruption and development 
 
Source: Transparency International, UN Human Development Report, 2011 
3.2 Corruption in Vietnam 
China and Vietnam are both belonging to the third-tier transition economies. Although 
both are experiencing an industrial boom, disorder and confusion still obstruct the 
economy and business development to some extent. Corruption issues are considered 
as a serious one both by the Vietnamese government and international institutions such 
as UNDP (Tsuboi, 2005). Although the focus of this thesis is to China, the assertion is 
that whether I am discussing Vietnam or China, the phenomenon of big corruption cases 
is essentially the same and can be understood in the same way (Gainsborough, 2003).  
China and Vietnam have similar corruption index levels, similar beginnings and current 
situation but a different track. Vietnam keeps facing increasing corruption index levels, 
which means that it has been improving anti-corruption and eliminating unfair market 
situation. However, China’s road has lots of twists and turns. China experienced the 
worst bribery year in 2010, which happened again after four years in 2014. 
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Figure 3.2 China Corruption Index21 and Vietnam Corruption Index 
 
Source: Trading Economics 
Corruption in Vietnam has two definitions provided by international institutions and 
local government. International organizations believe that any acts of demanding 
money outside of fixed charge or taking commissions for favors on the part of the civil 
servants are regarded as corruption (Tsuboi, 2005). While local governments 
conventionally insist that because the basic salaries are not high enough to cover the 
living cost. Therefore, getting a commission for the service they provide cannot be 
considered as corruption and it is relatively fair for them to get it. For example, 
Vietnamese civil servants can get 200 USD at the beginning of their career life, and 
when retiring, their salary is around 600 USD. Only if the person takes other parts or 
the whole department's commission fee, it can be called "corruption" (Tsuboi, 2005).  
In order to see the firm-level corruption, I found the findings of Rand, J. and Tarp, F., 
(2012). 30 per cent of firms are asked to pay extra to get easier access to public services. 
Around 21 per cent give informal payments to deal with taxes and tax collectors; 
whereas 16 per cent pays in order to get favourable conditions in a bid for a government 
                                            
2 1 A country or region’ s Corruption Index score means the perceived level of public sector 
corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 
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contract. Additionally, bribes paid to gain government contracts are on average the 
largest as measured relative to firm revenues. I had an interview with a Vietnamese 
manager who helped foreign firms entering the Vietnamese market. He suggested that 
in order to save time to get stamps, documents and licenses, paying extra money in the 
back room would make business to go more smoothly and efficiently. In other words, 
public officers will not ask for payment and firms should do it actively. Either transfer 
money to their relatives’ international bank account or bring them a bag of cash. 
There is a well-known example to describe how terrible the corruption is in Vietnam, 
which has been exposed by some videos. When Chinese tourists visit Vietnam, Chinese 
need to pay 35 USD as entry visa fee at the Customer. In general, it takes several 
minutes to give a stamp and ask some questions. However, if Chinese accept to give 
"tips" then it only takes seconds; otherwise, travelers can be called upon to wait more 
than one hour. Tips are between 1 to 15 euros, depending on the visitor’s outlook and 
appearance.  
3.3 Corruption Discussion on Firm Level 
The harassment theory, suggested by Clarke and Xu (2004) that the more profitable 
firms are, the more likely they make informal payments. Or in other words, profitability 
is somehow correlated with bribe payments.  It is a consistent phenomenon that these 
firms pay higher bribes than less profitable enterprises. Throughout this paper, 
especially in the quantitative study, ‘bribery’ is used as being synonymous with 
‘corruption’. Craig Charney and Shehzad Qazi (2015) post an accurate number to show 
the corruption situation in China from firms’ perspective. 35% of companies in China 
say they have to pay bribes or give gifts to officials to operate. This picture is also 
shown by the World Bank indicating that around 34.26% of the companies tend to 
disagree that “the court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted” in China and 4.37% 
are strongly opposed (Table 3.3). For example, many business people said directly or 
indirectly that firms are always required to pay informal bills to public officials or 
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departments to deal with clients, taxes, licenses, permissions, regulations, services, etc. 
Therefore, it is necessary to figure out the common characters among these one-third 
companies. 
Table 3.3 Do you think “The court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted”? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Don't know 33 1.22 1.22 
Refuse to answer 4 0.15 1.37 
Strongly disagree 118 4.37 5.74 
Tend to disagree 925 34.26 40.00 
Tend to agree 1,430 52.96 92.96 
Strongly agree 190 7.04 100.00 
Total 2,700 100.00  
 Source: World Bank 2012 
If we say that corruption is a big problem which is definitely difficult to solve and 
occurs in all countries more or less in different forms, then we should see how 
widespread the problem is and where it is occurring in the worst form. Based on the 
World Bank China Enterprise Survey (2012) and White Paper from Charney Research 
(2015), there are five key findings that might affect the bribes that enterprises have to 
pay to the government and utility officers. Namely: firms’ locations, ownerships, 
industry, size and manager gender. Therefore, these factors will be employed in the data 
and method part.  
3.3.1 Firm Location 
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The corruption is affected by various city characteristics and can be reduced by the 
law and policy enforcement. For example, Singapore and Hong Kong focus on the 
anti-corruption strategies which are adopted by both city-states with emphasis on the 
legislative and institutional measures (Quah, 1994). The result of discussing these 
corrupt practices in one small city can be applied in many cities (Gardiner, 1970). 
Therefore, I can get a basic conclusion that the more law-obeyed city, the less 
corruption it will have.  
However, Charney Research (2015) gave an entirely opposite answer. Officials have 
their hands out for gifts occurring most often around Beijing, the capital, and in the 
richer regions (Craig & Shehzad, 2015). Figure 3.31 is based on a sample of 136 
relatively prominent cases of officials who have been investigated or prosecuted by 
China's various disciplinary organs since late 2012. This sample is a fraction of the total 
36,907 recorded officials (Startfor, 2014). This bar figure demonstrates that this anti-
corruption campaign is more heavily targeted the south and southwest such as 
Guangdong and Sichuan. Among all the province-level cities, Beijing and the central 
government has attracted more scrutiny (Startfor, 2014). The most pick place is exactly 
the political center of the whole nation.  
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Figure3.3 Anti-corruption Driven by Administration Region 
 
Source: South China Morning Post, 2014 
Look at Figure 3.4, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou are the most corrupted cities in 
China, reaching 43%, 34% and 39% separately. While for the rural part or non-
developed part such as northeast, southwest and west relatively low corruption rate 
levels can be observed. Meanwhile, the World Bank also gives a bar graph to show the 
bribery index (Figure 3.5).  Zhengzhou, Henan province is the most corrupted city 
among the 25 investigated cities. It is necessary to mention that Zhengzhou is not a 
traditional business city, but it is for sure a capital city. 
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Figure3.4 Reports of Corruption – By Region (Percent reporting paying bribes to operate) 
 
Source: White Paper NO.1 by Charney Research 
Figure3.5 Bribery Incidence (percent of firms expecting at least one bribe payment request) 
 
Source: Enterprises Survey, the World Bank 
3.3.2 Firms Ownership 
An underdeveloped legal system makes private-company executives more dependent 
on guanxi than in state-owned or collective-hybrid companies. Compared to SOEs, 
private-company executives considered business connections more relevant, depending 
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more on protection connections, requiring more government connections, sent more 
unreciprocated gifts, and trusted their connections more. (Xin, & Pearce, 1996, 
pp.1641-1658.) 
However, Clarke and Xu (2004) pointed out that privately owned utilities have less 
common and lower bribes. One reason for this finding is that private firms might have 
a greater incentive than public officers to impose penalties upon employees being 
corrupted.  
Because of the decision-making uncertainty, international market participants often 
face high-risk levels about target markets. Foreign companies often don not get 
adequate information and have a risk in predicting consequences of decisions. (Lee, 
Pae, & Wong, 2001, pp.51-69). As a consequence, they lack confidence in making 
strategic decisions (Achrol and Stern, 1988). The other problem would be language and 
culture, which bring foreign owned firms obstacles in mutual understanding of each 
other (Lee, Pae, & Wong, 2001, pp.51-69). This problem can be reduced or even solved 
by mutual understanding and mature conversation.  
Due to the uncertainty from government parts, companies' owners have thousands of 
problems such as whether there is an adequate amount of information. Whether the 
outcomes of a certain decision are predictable and how confident the decision makers 
are with the decision outcomes. Alternative ways in advance are to recognize the 
political nature of international business and regard the role of the government as a 
factor of protection when firms must manage in their guanxi or network in China. 
(Boddewyn, & Brewer, 1994. pp.119-143). 
The important aspect of Chinese management may be made more understandable to 
Westerners, and its use by western managers enhanced and encouraged (Tsang, 1998, 
pp. 64-73). Therefore, foreign funded companies are essential to build and protect 
guanxi towards the government. This conclusion can be illustrated by Figure 3.6. In 
addition, Business Insider (2015) pointed out that Hong Kong-owned firms were also 
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more likely to pay bribes at 44 percent, compared to foreign enterprises at 37 percent, 
while mainland Chinese firms have the lowest around 32 percent.  
Figure3.6 Bribery Incidence (percent of public transactions where a gift or informal payment was 
requested) 
 
Source: Enterprises Survey, the World Bank 
In the regression section, I will only discuss POEs and FOEs regardless SOEs. Firstly, 
SOEs have with no doubt more connections with the government even when there are 
only 10% shares held by SOEs. In addition, it is difficult to measure endogenous within 
SOEs because a random dinner, or gift can be both regarded as corruptions or covered 
in the clothes called personal guanxi. At last, employers in SOEs have “iron bowls” 
which means that their salaries are less connected with their performance. It is therefore 
less likely for their employers to bribe in exchange for outstanding performance.  
3.3.3 Industry Sector 
Every industry has a possibility to do corruption. For some companies, in order to 
enter restrict competition such as airlines, military equipment or become monopolies, 
they will spend plenty of money attempting to convince the tax offices or related 
departments (Mauro, 1997). This expense can be used to get licenses or expand 
guanxi. For economists, this cost is called "rent", for something which is useful and 
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the supplier is limited (Mauro, 1997). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have 
pointed out that corruption may be far more damaging than taxation to the economic 
growth. Due to the black shadow and uncertainty of higher transaction, unlike the tax, 
bribe payment and corrupted contracts are not enforceable in courts (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993).  
From a governmental point of view, they are seeking the prospective industry for the 
given region or whole nation developing, which makes motor vehicles the leading 
section (Figure 3.7). Generally, the government is more tended to protect local industry 
or home industry (Mauro, 1997). Therefore, trade restrictions lead to some non-
government-pet companies to do corruption in order to get government support or 
favour, such as subsidies or licenses etc.  
Figure 3.7 Bribery Incidence (percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request) 
 
Source: Enterprises Survey, the World Bank 
Among all the industries, industry-wise, real estate, and manufacturing tend to 
corruption (Table 3.4). To be specific, metals, residential reality, transportation 
construction and commercials construction are the most suspicious in the scrutiny 
zone.  
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Table 3.4 Which Industry has the most corruption? 
Real Estate 
And 
Construction 
Residential 
Realty 
Transportation 
Construction 
Commercial 
Construction 
Commercial 
Reality 
Residential 
Construction 
  
41% 44% 42% 40% 39% 39%   
Manufacturing Metals Capital Goods Food It Automotive 
Chemi
cals 
Textil
es 
36% 46% 39% 36% 34% 33% 33% 32% 
Services Media 
Chain 
Restaurants 
Telecom/It 
Firms 
Business 
Service 
Private 
Healthcare 
  
35% 38% 38% 38% 35% 25%   
Retail 
Luxury 
Goods 
Apparel Food 
Furniture And 
Appliances 
Automotive   
34% 38% 37% 34% 32% 28%   
Transportation Shipping Travel Agency      
32% 37% 28%      
Source: Charney Research (2015) 
3.3.4 Firms Size 
As a company, growth, and profit are the main things to care about. In order to get 
success, it is a must, to figure out which factors affect growth. The development of 
finance and institutions weaken the constraining effects of financial, legislation and 
corruption limitation. Therefore, it is again the smaller firms that benefit the most (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005). Hence, the smallest firms are most constrained 
consistently. It is difficult to prove the relationship between the court of firm's country 
and the firm's growth, but it is believable that financial constraints from banks limited 
firms' growth (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005). In other words, the 
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corruption of bank official affect firm growth. For example, some small size companies 
have to seek financial support from a folk bank instead of a state owned bank. One for 
the Chinese policies is that it takes small private banks a long time to get a loan from 
SOE banks. The other effect is that it is easier to get a loan if small banks can give some 
commission fee to the private bank. This commission fee helps the whole process to be 
dealt with faster. This problem is relatively smaller in large and mature companies. But 
it is also rational that in the case that the larger sized company does corruption, the 
percentage is relatively less but the amount would be way larger than the one of the 
small sized company. 
3.3.5 Gender: Female Top Manager? 
Is it meaningful to discuss the relationship between gender and corruption? The first 
impression for most people is that human beings do corruption regardless of gender. 
But what if we think about this question seriously? Then the majority may believe that 
female does less corruption than males. True! Numerous behave studies have found 
women to be more trustworthy and rule-obeying than men. It is grounded in 
essentialist notions that women have higher moral nature and assumes they will bring 
this propensity to the public life (Goetz, 2007). Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) 
found that women should be particularly effective in promoting honest government. 
They also state that the more representation women are in the parliament, the less 
corruption occurs in these countries, and these result is based on a broad cross-section 
of countries.  
However, look at Figure 3.8 from the World Bank, it clearly shows that top female 
managers are slightly more corrupt than males. Although it is absolutely different 
from the common public knowledge, it is interesting to test for in my paper. 
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Figure 3.8 Bribery Incidence (percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe payment request) 
 
Source: Enterprises Survey, the World Bank 
Therefore, according to the literature above, I state my hypothesis as followed. 
Hypothesis: Foreign owned, capital city located and national market targeted large 
company are more likely to build business-government relations, which also has the 
significant possibility or risk to do corruption. 
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Chapter 4  
Methodology 
In order to answer my hypotheses, I use the Manufacturing module of the World 
Banks China Enterprise Survey 2012, which was obtained between December 2011 
and February 2013. The purpose of this survey was to obtain feedback from 
enterprises on the state of the private sector in China. Meanwhile, this survey helps to 
build a panel data of enterprise in order to track changes in the business environment 
over time and impact assessments of reforms (Implementation Report, 2013). I have 
obviously asked and got the authority from the World Bank to use these data for my 
master thesis.  
The survey included 2489 privately-owned and 87 foreign owned firms and was 
conducted in order to build up a panel data set of enterprises. In this survey, the World 
Bank left its usual focus on private firms only, due to the importance of State owned 
companies within the Chinese economy. Information was gained from low-middle level 
managers in different organizational firms, located in the following twenty-five metro 
areas: Beijing (municipalities), Chengdu City, Dalian City, Dongguan City, Foshan 
City, Guangzhou City, Hangzhou City, Hefei City, Jinan City, Luoyang City, Nanjing 
City, Nantong City, Ningbo City, Qingdao City, Shanghai (municipalities), Shenyang 
City, Shenzhen City, Shijiazhuang City, Suzhou City, Tangshan City, Wenzhou City, 
Wuhan City, Wuxi City, Yantai City, Zhengzhou City. Further relevant information is 
that the study is only about non-agricultural companies with at least five employees and 
also excludes the financial sector, real estate, renting activities and all public and utility 
sectors.  
4.1 Dependent Variable 
The court system is relatively complicated in China and corruption is a sensitive topic, 
which decides that it is impossible to get direct data. Therefore, I choose four different 
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variables which can be indicating the necessity of building business-government 
relations and the possibility of corruption.  The four variables are 1. whether the 
company is asked to give gifts or informal payment, 2. has the company secured or 
attempted to secure a government contract, 3. how much percentage of the contract 
that government asked as informal payment and 4. whether the company is visited or 
inspected by tax offices. When studying the relationship between bribes and the firms 
type, it is necessary to somehow scale the level of bribe payments. These four 
dependent variables can imply the corruption level among these firms (Fisman, & 
Svensson, 2007).  
In order to understand the first dependent variable "gift", I would like to give a precise 
definition. In China, there is an old saying about private and personal behavior from 
government and tax office, which is called “Chi Na Ka Yao”. Each word means an 
illegal action. Chi means inviting or being forced to invite officers to have a luxury 
dinner together. Na is about taking some stuff from the company such as shares, profits 
etc. Ka is the Chinese meaning of card in English; obviously, it means gift card, gas 
card etc. and Yao indicates officers ask some benefit or coupons directly such as good 
wine, cash etc. It is also necessary to mention about informal payment (the third 
dependent variable). In general, informal payments are used in three functions. First to 
get connected to public services. Second, to deal with tax and tax collectors and the 
third is to deal with customs (Rand, J. and Tarp, F., 2012). Visiting or inspecting by tax 
office (the fourth dependent variable) is direct evidence to show the interaction between 
public officials and firms. 
About the second dependent variable (has the company secured or attempted to secure 
a government contract), does government contract mean corruption? To be honest, 
there is no casual cause between government contract and bribery. In some developed 
countries and regions such as Japan and Hong Kong, government contracts are as 
normal as companies' contract. While in China and Vietnam, it indicated large benefit 
and support from the government. For the society sight, these firms who get government 
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contracts have strong guanxi with the government, either in the form of personal- or 
interest guanxi. 
4.2 Independent Variables 
In order to get reliable and comparable results, I need to check for several factors that 
have a potential influence on my regression results. Firstly, I also controlled for the 
ownership since Chinese law and the national situation decide for different methods 
while developing business. Because SOEs have an obvious strong tie with the 
government, there is no meaning to compare it to private firms. So as a result of this, I 
only choose local private companies and foreign owned companies. Empirical work 
shows that in general, guanxi has a positive impact on market performance for domestic 
and foreign firms. (Sheng, Zhou, and Li, 2011). Additionally, I will control my models 
for the competition level, based on some competitors, since competition influences the 
future of the company. According to economic theory, location and sector factors of 
the structure of corruption, can also be assumed as potential factors (Kimuyu, 2007). 
Therefore, I use the control variables “capital city” and “industry sector”. 
There is empirical evidence confirming that the size of a firm has indeed a positive 
influence on its guanxi or bribe payment, which also has a profound and positive 
impact on the firms’ efficiency and growth (Luo, & Chen, 1997). Furthermore, I will 
control for the size of the firms because larger organizations are more visible to 
bureaucrats (Fisman, & Svensson, 2007), due to some advantages such as more 
networks and contracts in the market. Also, the firm's age might play a role as 
mentioned in the introduction based on Utterback (1994). Many firm-level studies 
have stated that firms age may be correlated with bribes because longer established 
firms have better access to both financial support and government contacts (Fisman, 
& Svensson, 2007). So I include the log of the firm's age.  
Corruption is undoubtedly a human being action, which is also connected to the gender. 
Generally, female owners are associated with a lower incidence of bribery and report 
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smaller levels of bribery (Breen, Gillanders, McNulty, & Suzuki, 2016), but it is still 
interesting to see if the results hold in a Chinese context.  
4.3 Econometric Model 
Based on these dependent and independent variables as well as on the theory mentioned 
above, I constructed four models. 𝛾1 = 𝛽1Χ1 + 𝛽2Χ2 + 𝛽3Χ3 + 𝛽4Χ4 + 𝛽5Χ5 + 𝛽6Χ6 + 𝛽7Χ7 + 𝛽8Χ8 + 𝔢 𝛾2 = 𝛽1Χ1 + 𝛽2Χ2 + 𝛽3Χ3 + 𝛽4Χ4 + 𝛽5Χ5 + 𝛽6Χ6 + 𝛽7Χ7 + 𝛽8Χ8 + 𝔢 𝛾3 = 𝛽1Χ1 + 𝛽2Χ2 + 𝛽3Χ3 + 𝛽4Χ4 + 𝛽5Χ5 + 𝛽6Χ6 + 𝛽7Χ7 + 𝛽8Χ8 + 𝔢 𝛾4 = 𝛽1Χ1 + 𝛽2Χ2 + 𝛽3Χ3 + 𝛽4Χ4 + 𝛽5Χ5 + 𝛽6Χ6 + 𝛽7Χ7 + 𝛽8Χ8 + 𝔢 
γ1=whether the company is asked to give gift or informal payment 
γ2=has the company secured or attempted to secure a government contract 
γ3=how much percentage of the contract that government asked as informal payment 
γ4=whether the company is visited or inspected by tax office 
β1=firm age 
β2=whether the company is in the capital city 
β3=private owned firms 
β4=foreign owned firms 
β5=female manager 
β6=numbers of competitors 
β7=firm size 
β8=main market 
Based on the previous variable description I carefully choose my model. The dependent 
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variables for a gift, contract and visits are dummy variables. Therefore, probit models 
(Model 1,2 and 4) were an adequate choice given the fact that the data could be censored. 
While for the No.3 model, I choose the OLS method to run the following regression 
with robust standard errors. According to and based on theory of the previous sections, 
I choose these 8 independent variables. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
The summary statistics for all variables are listed in the table below (Table 4.1). In order 
to see the correlation between the dependent variables and control variables, I did the 
Pearson's Correlation test and a correlation matrix is demonstrated in Appendix 1.  
Table 4.1 Summary statistic of used variables 
Among all variables, gift requested, government contract, visited by tax office, capital 
city, female manager, private firms and foreign firms are dummy variables. 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gift requested 1,585 .0902208 .2865883 0 1 
Government Contract  2,659 .148176 .3553412 0 1 
Visited by tax office 2,660 .6778195 .4673995 0 1 
Informal payment (%) 1,886 .1861082 1.455198 0 30 
Firm age(log) 2,626 2.411082 .50759 0 4.823 
Capital city 2,696 .4881306 .5021734 0 1 
Private firms 2,700 .9218519 .2684543 0 1 
Foreign firms 2,700 .0322222 .1766225 0 1 
Female manager 2,696 .1101632 .3131512 0 1 
Number of competitors 1,326 15.45872 40.57479 0 500 
Firms size 2,700 1.914074 .8006262 1 3 
National market 1,692 1.911348 .5196904 1 3 
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Table 4.2 Explanations of Dummy Variables  
Dummy Variables  Meaning 
Gift Requested 
0 The company is not requested to giving gifts 
1 The company is requested to giving gifts 
Government 
Contract 
0 Company didn’t attempt to secure a government contract 
1 Company attempted to secure a government contract 
Visited By Tax 
Office 
0 The company is not visited or inspected by tax office 
1 The company is visited or inspected by tax office 
Capital City 
0 The company is not located in capital city 
1 The company is located in capital city 
Female Manager 
0 The top manager is not a female 
1 The top manager is a female 
Privates Firms 0 Less than 51% owned by private 
1 Equal or more than 51% owned by private  
Foreign Firms 0 Less than 51% owned by foreigner 
1 Equal or more than 51% owned by foreigner 
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Chapter 5  
Result and Discussion 
5.1 Regression Result of the Corruption Models  
The results of the regressions are presented as followed in Table 5.1. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  
Table 5.1 Regression Result of the Corruption Models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Gift 
Requested 
(Probit) 
Government 
Contract  
(Probit) 
Informal 
Payment (%) 
(OLS) 
Visited By 
Tax Office 
(Probit) 
Age(log) -0.00498 -0.00160 0.000280 -0.000254 
 (0.00860) (0.00634) (0.00878) (0.00492) 
Capital City 0.512*** 0.259*** -0.233 0.0888 
 (0.127) (0.0961) (0.152) (0.0768) 
Private Owned Firms -0.287 0.674** -0.418* 1.401*** 
 (0.421) (0.323) (0.252) (0.175) 
Foreign Owned Firms -0.726 0.770* -0.0638 1.406*** 
 (0.622) (0.406) (0.432) (0.267) 
Female Manager 0.0943 0.185 -0.344 -0.0343 
 (0.235) (0.163) (0.320) (0.138) 
Number Of Competitors 0.00158 0.00141 0.00108 0.00713* 
 (0.00214) (0.00248) (0.00312) (0.00399) 
Middle Size Company -0.110 0.228* -0.236 0.215** 
 (0.162) (0.126) (0.173) (0.0912) 
Large Size Company -0.264 0.483*** -0.161 0.612*** 
 (0.177) (0.131) (0.191) (0.104) 
National Market -0.0120 0.132 -0.303* 0.204** 
 (0.166) (0.125) (0.170) (0.0928) 
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Constant -1.082** -2.091*** -0.813** -1.298*** 
 (0.466) (0.360) (0.328) (0.212) 
R-squared 0.0459 0.0921 0.0141 0.0736 
Observations 760 1,268 926 1,278 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The Variance Inflating Factor (VIF) shows that there is no multicollinearity in my 
models.  
5.2 Discussion   
From the result above, it can clearly be seen that the firm's location, ownership, 
competitors, size and the main market have significant results towards the corruption 
situation.  
First of all, capital cities have a positive probability of corruption, especially in giving 
gifts and getting a contract from the government. As I mentioned before that a capital 
city is the political center and the richer place in a province, so based on the 
"advantages". It is easier to build guanxi and to do corruption as well. Yet very little is 
known for sure about what causes corruption to be higher in one place than another.  
Furthermore, ownership is also one of the most important points I focused on. Both 
POEs (private owned enterprises) and FOEs (foreign owned enterprises) have 
significantly higher possibilities in securing government contracts and visits by the tax 
office. Additionally, FOEs has slightly positive correlations in these two criteria. The 
main reason would most likely be that either FOEs are more eager to get local 
government support or government always spend more time management on FOEs, 
which is strongly correlated with the number of compliance inspections (Rand, & Tarp, 
2012). It is surprising to see the negative sign shown on the gift and informal payment. 
Private owned firms are 41.8% less corrupted. I think this might be due to the case that 
a corrupter will be put into prison if he gets reported by someone with conclusive 
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evidences. However, getting something from the contract can be regarded as the 
convention, which is called brokerage or commission fee in general. Both behaviors are 
illegal but "commission fee" sounds relatively better and has also more space for 
possible explanations compared with the direct gift. 
Furthermore, the literature indicates completely that small size firms are more prone to 
do the corruption, while my result shows that big business have a higher probability to 
be involved into corruption. There are three reasons I concern to be explainable. First 
of all, large size companies have more guanxi in the society and government, which 
helps them to secure the government contracts. Second, large companies are the pillar 
in the certain industry or local city. Hence, the government needs to focus on it and 
visits it more frequently. Last but not the least, if large companies have competitors, 
then these companies need more resources and support to compete. Therefore, good 
guanxi with government is an easier way to win these competitions.  
The number of competitors also has significantly positive correlation with business-
government relationships. The more competitors a company has, the more they are 
willing to be connected with the government. Increasing competitions will increase the 
total supply of service and products. With fewer competitors' companies, or for instance 
monopolists, the companies have the intensive to restrict output. However, due to 
multiple service providers, the government can switch providers as easy as they want 
and bribery can help companies to keep the cooperation with government or substitute 
others and expand its market share. 
Last but not the least, national market business is 33% less corrupted in informal 
payment, but more likely to be visited by the tax office. One explanation can be that 
there is no big benefit to build and keep guanxi with its own local government. For 
the national-market-targeted company, either they are big sized companies which 
have been discussed above or they are an online business such as Taobao shop seller, 
who does not need to keep in touch with the local government. Because of collinearity 
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in the regression result, the international market target firms cannot be analyzed.  
From Figure 5.1, China and Russia have extreme and the worst performance. These 
two countries companies always pay bribes if they are export-led firms. Firms may be 
more vulnerable for rent extraction or bribe payment if they are involved in either 
exporting trade or importing trade (Fisman & Svensson, J., 2007).  
Figure 5.1 Bribe Payers index of 28 leading export nations 
 
Source: Transparency International,2011 
Due to the complication of guanxi and corruption, it is impossible to control all the 
related variables. In the social science field, there are hundreds of factors which may 
impact the bribery result. This might be an explanation for the relativley low R-Square.   
After my methology and tests, my hypothesis is failed to reject, so that one can expect 
that capital city located firms, foreign-owned firms, and large size firms are more 
eager to build "guanxi" and also have the higher potential probability of bribery.  
5.3 Implications of Corruption 
There is no doubt that firms’ corruption is just like a bug in the stability of the society, 
that destroy the relationship between government and firms, government and people, 
firms and people. First of all, it deeply damages the economic benefits and social 
welfare of the country, employees, citizens etc. Moreover, the establishment and 
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completion of the market system is ruined by corruption. The economy cannot be 
developed without a fair and clean market, especially in China. The supervision of one 
"invisible hand” marketing and one “visible hand” macro-control or government will 
be out of order under bribery. At last, corruption will decrease the country’s reputation, 
influence the foreign direct investment and cultivate corrupted economy environment. 
In a nut shell, avoiding firms’ corruption is one of the priority jobs that government 
should highlight on the memorandum and this paper provides several reasons for it.   
5.4 Limitation 
The biggest limitation and also a possible explanation of my results is the data limitation. 
The dataset in this paper is from World Bank Survey (2012), which is 5 years ago. As 
I mentioned above, 18th National Congress (2012 November) witnessed the anti-
corruption fight within the whole nation. The situation nowadays is quite different from 
2012. In addition, because of the lacking panel data, I can only do the cross-section test 
which makes the result monotonous. Longitudinal studies would allow me to 
understand the guanxi more thoroughly and provide more conclusive findings on the 
direction of causality between company type and guanxi. Panel data would also correct 
for the case that 2012 was an outlier year. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Unlike most published literature which focuses on the causality between corruption and 
environment or how to design anti-corruption instruments, my emphasis will be put into 
firm-level corruption and see what kind of firms are more likely to build these relations. 
This also indicates that these companies have more possibilities to do bribery in this 
paper.  
I started out in this paper with introducing the definition of a business-government 
relation. Then to be specific, I focused on China, where it is called "guanxi”. There are 
three different type of “guanxi”, family, friendships and interest guanxi separately. 
“Guanxi" has its advantages and disadvantages. For a good way, it helps to overcome 
the recourse or information limitations, offers a preferential treatment in business 
cooperation, avoids external risk and competition, enhance their cultural affinity and 
reduces alienation.  
However, the negative of “guanxi” cannot be ignored because extreme “guanxi” will 
lead to corruption. Hereby, I mainly discuss governments and firms' corruption and 
compare China's situation with Japan's and Vietnam’s. Japan has less corruption so that 
China can learn from it. Vietnam has similar corruption models like China, but in an 
extremer way. 
As I know, there is so far no published literature pointing out clearly what kind of firms' 
have corruption suspicions. The majority of the results are based on empiricism and 
theoretical reasoning. Therefore, I make full advantage of a unique dataset that contains 
information on the estimated bribe payments of Chinese firms and figure out what kind 
of firms would be prone to develop "guanxi" or even do corruption. The result states 
that capital city located firms, foreign-owned firms, and large size firms have demanded 
to build "guanxi" and also have the higher potential possibility to do the corruption.  
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Admittedly, there are some limitations in my paper and some future research 
possibilities that occurred. Due to the specialty of Chinese society, it is almost 
impossible to conduct a direct corruption data set. Since I do not have a panel data set 
yet, I am not able to answer the inter-dependency between business-government 
relations and firms’ development. However, the data set was announced to be the 
beginning of a panel data set, so that a repeating study can be conducted in several years, 
answering some of the remaining questions. This would also help to overcome the 
threat that 2012 would have been for instance an outlier year.  
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Appendix 1 
 Appendix 1 Table of Descriptive Correlations  (obs=558) 
  
informal 
payment contract visit gift age 
capital 
city private foreign 
female 
manager 
compet
itors size market 
informal 
payment 1.000             
contract 0.031  1.000            
visit 0.013  0.026  1.000           
gift 0.286  0.176  0.021  1.000          
age -0.015  0.009  
-
0.051  
-
0.031  1.000         
capital city -0.012  -0.027  
-
0.083  0.082  0.024  1.000        
private 0.022  0.047  0.226  0.028  
-
0.048  -0.008  1.000       
foreign -0.015  -0.020  0.012  
-
0.046  
-
0.063  0.019  -0.757  1.000      
fmanager -0.046  -0.007  0.023  0.055  
-
0.061  0.024  -0.030  0.073  1.000     
competitors -0.019  0.019  0.013  0.003  
-
0.004  0.058  -0.017  -0.020  0.006  1.000    
size -0.114  0.089  
-
0.088  
-
0.075  0.151  0.033  -0.042  0.009  -0.016  -0.032  1.000   
market -0.083  0.062  
-
0.037  
-
0.024  0.111  -0.064  -0.017  -0.006  -0.023  0.016  0.241  1.000  
 
 
 
